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Web sites that accept and display content such as wiki ar-
ticles or comments typically filter the content to prevent
injected script code from running in browsers that view the
site. The diversity of browser rendering algorithms and
the desire to allow rich content makes filtering quite diffi-
cult, however, and attacks such as the Samy and Yamanner
worms have exploited filtering weaknesses. To solve this
problem, this paper proposes a simple mechanism called
Browser-Enforced Embedded Policies (BEEP). The idea is
that a web site can embed a policy inside its pages that spec-
ifies which scripts are allowed to run. The browser, which
knows exactly when it will run a script, can enforce this
policy perfectly. We have added BEEP support to several
browsers, and built tools to simplify adding policies to web
applications. We found that supporting BEEP in brows-
ers requires only small and localized modifications, modify-
ing web applications requires minimal effort, and enforcing
policies is generally lightweight.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many web sites republish content supplied by their user
communities, or by third parties such as advertising net-
works and search engines. If this republished content con-
tains scripts, then visitors to the site can be exposed to
attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS) [2], and can them-
selves become participants in attacks on the web site and on
others [14]. The standard defense is for the web site to filter
or transform any content that does not originate from the
site itself, to remove scripts and other potentially harmful
elements [20, 29, 18].
Filtering is complicated in practice. Sites want to allow
their users to provide rich content, with images, hyperlinks,
typographic stylings and so on. Scripts can be embedded in
rich content in many ways, and it is nontrivial to disable the
scripts without also disabling the rich content. One reason is
that different browsers parse and render content differently:
filtering that is effective for one browser can be ineffective
for another. Moreover, browsers try to be forgiving, and can
parse and render wildly malformed content, in unexpected
ways. All of these complications have come into play in
real attacks that have evaded server-side filtering (e.g., the
Samy [27] and Yamanner [3] worms).
We propose a new technique to prevent script injection
attacks, based on the following two observations:
Observation 1: Browsers perform perfect script detection.
If a browser does not parse content as a script while it
renders a web page, that content will not be executed.
Observation 2: The web application developer knows ex-
actly what scripts should be executed for the applica-
tion to function properly.
The first observation implies that the browser is the ideal
place to filter scripts. Indeed, for some web applications
(e.g., GPokr, S3AjaxWiki), most or all of the application
logic is executed in the browser, with the web site acting
only as a data store. For these applications, browser-side
filtering may be the only option.
The second observation implies that the web site should
supply the filtering policy to the browser—it can specify
which scripts are approved for execution and the browser
will filter the rest. In short, the web site sets the policy
and the browser enforces it. We call this strategy Browser-
Enforced Embedded Policies (BEEP).
There are many possible ways to implement BEEP. In
this paper, we have used a method that is easy to imple-
ment while still permitting very general policies. In our im-
plementation, the security policy is expressed as a trusted
JavaScript function that the web site embeds in the pages it
serves. We call this function the security hook. A suitably-
modified browser passes each script it detects to the security
hook during parsing (along with other relevant information)
and will only execute the script if the hook approves it.
Our implementation of BEEP has several advantages.
Flexible policies. The security hook can be any func-
tion that can be implemented in JavaScript. So far we have
implemented two simple kinds of policies (but we are not
restricted to these policies).
Our first policy is a whitelist, in which the hook function
includes a one-way hash of each legitimate script appearing
in the page. When a script is detected in the browser and
passed to the hook function, the hook function hashes the
script and matches it against the whitelist; any script whose
hash is not in the list is rejected.
Our second policy is a DOM sandbox. Here, the web ap-
plication structures its pages to identify content that might
include malicious scripts. The possibly-malicious user con-
tent is placed inside of a <div> or <span> element that acts
as a sandbox:
<div class="noexecute">. . . possibly-malicious
content. . .</div>
Within the sandbox, rich content (typographic styling, etc.)
is enabled, but all scripts are disabled. When invoked, the
hook function will examine the document in its parsed rep-
resentation, a Document Object Model (DOM) tree. Be-
ginning at the DOM node of the script, the hook function
inspects all of the nodes up to the root of the tree, looking
for “noexecute” nodes. If such a node is found, the script is
not executed.1
While these policies are sufficient to stop injected scripts,
other policies are also possible. For example, the hook func-
tion could also notify the web site when an injected script is
found. A hook function could even analyze scripts and per-
mit only a restricted class of scripts to execute. Policies can
be easily modified over time: the new policy is simply em-
bedded in the site’s pages and will be enforced by browsers
from then on.
Complete coverage. With policies like the whitelist and
DOM sandbox, BEEP detects and filters all injected scripts,
under two conditions. First, to use these policies, all ap-
proved scripts must be identified by the web site in advance
either directly (by enumerating them) or indirectly (by iden-
tifying where scripts cannot occur); this is straightforward
for most applications (and is discussed in more detail in Sec-
tions 3.5 and 4.2). Second, the browser must install the secu-
rity hook before any other scripts on the page are executed,
to ensure complete mediation. This is easily accomplished:
defining the hook as the first script in the document head
ensures it will be parsed first. Together, these conditions
imply that any non-approved script will be rejected before
it has a chance to run.
Easy deployment. Our method requires modifying brows-
ers, but the changes are minimal, and the places where
browsers need to be modified are easily identified. We simply
locate places in the source code where the browser invokes
the JavaScript interpreter; these are the points where the
browser has identified a script in a web page. At this point
in the source code, the browser has gathered together all of
the information needed to invoke the JavaScript interpreter,
and we only need to insert code to invoke the interpreter on
our security hook function first. Depending on the result of
this first invocation, we will either execute the script from
the page, or skip it. We have successfully modified the Kon-
queror and Safari browsers to support security hooks, and
we have implemented partial support in the closed-source
Opera browser. These changes required just over 650 lines
of code in the first two cases (compared to several hundred
thousand for the browsers’ rendering engines), and just over
a hundred lines of JavaScript for Opera.
Web applications must also be modified to use BEEP,
but the changes are simple and localized. We will show
how we modified some existing web applications to embed
policies, and describe some simple tools we built to help in
this process.
Finally, deployment can proceed incrementally. Browsers
that do not support hooks will still render pages that de-
fine hooks, albeit without the protection they offer. Servers
can (and should) continue to filter user content, with BEEP
serving as a second line of defense against scripts that escape
detection. Moreover, while we intend that web sites be re-
sponsible for embedding appropriate policies, policies could
also be embedded by other means. For example, a third
party could generate a whitelist for an infected site, and a
1We must take care to prevent cleverly formatted content



























Figure 1: Script injection attack on a typical
Wiki/Blog-based site, like MySpace.
firewall or other proxy could insert the whitelist policy into
pages served from that site.
Moderate overhead. When a browser renders a BEEP-
enabled web page, there is some additional overhead for
parsing the security hook function and executing the hook
function whenever a script is parsed. After running some
simple experiments we found that overheads on rendering
time averaged 8.3% for whitelist policies and 25.7% for sand-
box policies, typically amounting to a fraction of a second.
These percentages do not include network time, which would
further reduce overhead if accounted for.
The next section presents some background, and the re-
mainder of the paper explains our BEEP technique and poli-
cies, describes our implementation, and presents experimen-
tal results. The paper concludes by comparing BEEP to
related work.
2. BACKGROUND
Script injection, or cross-site scripting, is a very common
vulnerability: according to MITRE’s CVE list [17], it is the
most common class of reported vulnerabilities, surpassing
buffer overflows starting in 2005. Here we review script
injection attacks and illustrate why it is difficult to filter
scripts using standard server-side techniques.
2.1 Script Injection
We are concerned with attacks that cause a malicious
script, typically written in JavaScript, to be injected into
the content of a trusted web site. When a visitor views a
page on the site, the injected script is loaded and executed
in the visitor’s browser with the trusted site’s privileges.
The injected script can leak privileged information (cookies,
browsing history, and, potentially, any private content from
the site) [2]. The script can also use the visitor’s browser to
carry out denial of service attacks or other attacks on the
web site, or on others. If the web site is very popular, the
attack can be greatly amplified [14].
Script injection can be achieved in many ways. In cross-
site scripting (XSS), the attacker often exploits web sites
that insert user-provided text into pages without properly
filtering the text. For example, users in on-line communi-
ties like MySpace, Blogger, and Flickr may enter their own
content and add comments to the content of others. This
content is stored on the site and may be viewed by anyone.
1. <html><head>
2. <script src="a.js"></script>
3. <script> ... </script>




8. <img id=foo src="image.jpg">
9. <a class=bar></a>
10. <div style="background-image: url(javascript:alert(’JavaScript’))">...</div>







Figure 2: Ways of embedding scripts in web pages.
Because different users’ profiles are hosted by the same site,
if a malicious user were able to include a script in his con-
tent, any viewers of that content would run the script with
the privileges of the site. This would allow the malicious
user’s script to steal or modify the viewer’s content, includ-
ing private information stored at the site or at the browser
(e.g., as a cookie). Such an attack is shown in Figure 1.
Another way of injecting a script is by “reflection.” For
example, when asked for a non-existent page, many sites try
to produce a helpful page in response, with a “not found”
message that includes the URL of the non-existent page that
was requested. Therefore, if the site is not careful, an occur-
rence of the text <script>...</script> in the URL can be
executed on the visitor’s browser when it renders the “not
found” page. To exploit this, an attacker can try to entice




The attacker could place the URL in a spam e-mail, in a
blog comment or wiki entry on trusted.site, or even on
another site. If a victim follows the link, the script will run
in the “not found” page served by trusted.site, retrieve
the user’s trusted.site cookie, and send it to evil.site.
Another possible attack scenario [13] exploits the dynamic
nature of JavaScript-enabled web pages, where the HTML
content served from the web server is altered in the browser
by the execution of scripts. For instance, a site might be
constructed so that a URL of the form
http://vulnerable.site/welcome.html?name=Joe
produces personalized content using a static HTML page in
combination with an embedded script. In particular, the
script can use features like innerHTML and document.write
to modify the content of the page at the browser, personal-
ized according the value of “name.” This opens the possibil-
ity that a malicious script can be constructed entirely in the
browser, as a combination of “name” and other parameter
values, as well as the text of the page itself.
This can be taken to an extreme: web applications like
S3AjaxWiki [19] have no server-side logic at all. The ap-
plication logic consists entirely of JavaScript code that exe-
cutes in the browser, and the server is used solely as a data
store. In this case, clearly any measures to combat mali-
cious scripts must be taken in the browser (and S3AjaxWiki
currently provides no such measures).
2.2 Script Detection
The standard solution to script injection is for the web
site to filter or transform all possibly-malicious content so
that scripts are removed or made harmless, as shown in Fig-
ure 1. The simplest kind of filter is to escape the special
characters in the content to prevent scripts, if any, from
executing in the browser. For example, if some content con-
tains “<script>”, the special characters ‘<’ and ‘>’ can be
escaped as HTML entities ‘&lt;’ and ‘&gt;.’ This will cause
the browser to display the text “<script>” instead of exe-
cuting the script. When combined with technologies like
tainting [18] that track potentially-malicious content, this is
an excellent defense. Unfortunately, this simple approach
can prevent users from creating rich content. It renders
<script> elements harmless, but also disables features like
typographic styling (<b>, . . . ), lists (<ul>, <li>, . . . ), etc.,
from appearing in user content.
Therefore, many sites attempt to detect scripts within
possibly-malicious content, and filter only those portions of
the content. Unfortunately, detecting scripts is hard, for
several reasons:
Multiple vectors. Scripts can be embedded in a web
page in many ways; Figure 2 shows some examples. Line
2 embeds a script contained in a separate file. Line 3 is
an inline script. Line 4 is an event handler that will be
attached to the img element on line 8, and which will be
invoked when the user moves the mouse over the element.
Line 5 is an inline CSS style declaration that says that the
background of elements in class “.bar” should be gotten by
executing a script. The script is invoked by the browser as it
renders line 9. The script is contained in a javascript:URL;
such URLs can appear in a document wherever any other
URL can appear. Line 7 is an inline event handler that
will execute when the body of the document has finished
loading. Line 10 is an element that uses an inline CSS style
to invoke a script. Line 11 embeds script in XML appearing
in HTML; note that the script can be broken across multiple
CDATA sections. Line 12 is a refresh directive that indicates
that the page should be refreshed by loading a data:URL.
The data:URL is the base64 encoding of a javascript:URL,
and it is executed on page refresh. Of course, this is only
a partial list of how scripts can be embedded in web pages,
and we are currently in a phase where browsers are actively
being developed to enable more scripting.
Encodings and quoting. Quotes that delimit content
and encodings of special characters add further complica-
tions. There are multiple kinds of quoting and escaping (for
URLs, HTML, and JavaScript), which must be stripped at
multiple stages. There are multiple quote characters, plus
cases in which quotes can be omitted. The base64 encoding
of line 12 in Figure 2 is one example; others are line 13, which
uses a javascript:URL that has been character encoded, and
line 14, which uses HTML entity encoding to hide quote
characters in a script (this can confuse filters that look for
literal quote characters).
Browser quirks. Script detection is also complicated
by the fact that the process of rendering in the browser is
ill-defined. Different browsers can render pages in very dif-
ferent ways, so, what one browser sees as a script may not
be a script to another browser. Furthermore, browsers make
a best effort to render all pages, no matter how ill-formed:
better to render something than show a blank page or an
error message. This can create unintended means to embed
scripts. For example, some browsers allow newlines or other
non-printing characters to appear in the “javascript:” por-
tion of a javascript:URL, so that
<img src=’java
script:alert(1)’>
will result in script execution. For another example,
<img src=‘javascript:alert("Hello ’world’")‘>
can execute in some browsers, even though backquote (‘)
is not a standard quote character in HTML or JavaScript.
Even something completely malformed such as
<img """><script>alert("ack")</script>">
executes in some browsers.
2.3 Real world examples
All of these issues—multiple vectors, encodings, and brows-
er quirks—make script detection a hard problem, and give
rise to dozens of techniques for hiding scripts from detection,
available on public sites, e.g., ha.ckers.org [23]. These
techniques are effective in practice. For example, the Samy
worm defeated script filtering on MySpace in October 2005.
The worm caused over a million users to add “Samy” to
their MySpace “friends” list, and portions of the site had
to be closed down for several hours to repair the infection.
The worm’s author has written a nice description of how he
developed the worm and got it past the filters [27].
The Yamanner worm is another example. Yamanner at-
tacked Yahoo! Mail in June 2006 and infected almost 200,000
users [3]. It injected a script into HTML email, and prop-
agated when users read their mail. Yahoo! had filtering in
place, but Yamanner defeated it with input looking some-
thing like this:
<img src=". . . " target="onload="malicious script">
This input is completely harmless as-is, but Yahoo!’s filter
deleted the target attribute (which can be used for certain
information-disclosure attacks). This produced an injected
script in an onload event handler:
<img src=". . . " onload="malicious script">
So, an effective filter must not only detect scripts, but also
ensure that it does not introduce scripts.
3. Browser-Enforced Embedded Policies
We have argued that it is difficult for the web site to detect
and filter malicious scripts. We now present our alternative
approach in detail. The idea is for the web site to specify,
for each page, a security policy for allowing and disallowing
script execution. The policy is embedded in the pages and
enforced by the browser during page rendering. We call this
approach Browser-Enforced Embedded Policies (BEEP). In
the rest of this section, we describe one possible implementa-
tion of BEEP that provides complete coverage against script
injection attacks under typical assumptions.
3.1 Attacker Assumptions
We assume that the adversary has no special access to
served content, and attempts to inject malicious scripts oc-
cur as described in the previous section, e.g., by upload-
ing malicious content to a wiki or phishing with creatively-
formed URLs. Therefore, we assume that the web site is
trusted by site visitors, up to the limits of the same-origin
policy [25]: visitors are willing to execute scripts in site con-
tent, since they assume scripts to be tacitly endorsed by
the site. Likewise, visitors expect that the site will not dis-
tribute private information to a malicious third party. We
also assume that the attacker cannot modify content that is
en route from the web site; depending on the attacker, this
may require HTTPS for transport.
3.2 The Security Hook
In our implementation of BEEP, a web site specifies its
policy through a security hook that will be used to approve
scripts before execution in the browser. The hook is com-
municated to the browser as the definition of a JavaScript
function, afterParseHook. A specially-modified browser in-
vokes afterParseHook whenever it parses a script while ren-
dering pages. (The necessary browser modifications will be
described shortly.) If the hook function returns true then
the script is deemed acceptable and will be executed; other-
wise it will be ignored.
For the security hook to be an effective defense, it must
implement complete mediation: no script may escape scrutiny
by the security hook before the script runs. This implies
that the hook function must be installed before any mali-
cious scripts are parsed and executed. While the HTML
standard does not specify the order of parsing and execu-
tion, we have verified that in practice the major browsers
parse and execute the first <script> element in the head
first. We rely on this behavior of the browser by defining
the hook function as the first script in the <head> element of
the document. (It is straightforward to structure a web ap-
plication so that no dynamic content is ever included prior
to the security hook definition in the <head> of each web
page.) Note that putting the security hook function first
also ensures it is tamper-proof: any malicious scripts that
would modify the hook will be parsed after the hook is in-
stalled, and so be filtered by the hook and prevented from
running.
When a modified browser parses a script, it invokes the
afterParseHook function with three arguments: the text of
the parsed script; the DOM element of the parsed script;
and the event name (if any) for which the script is to be
installed as a handler. Thus when rendering the document
fragment
<body onload="alert(’hello’)"> ... </body>
the browser invokes afterParseHook on the text of the script,
i.e., "alert(’hello’)", the DOM node of the <body> ele-
ment, and the string "onload". The policy implemented by
the hook function can be any boolean function that can be
programmed in JavaScript. We have experimented with two
kinds of policies: whitelists and DOM sandboxes. We discuss
these next.
3.3 Whitelists
Most current web applications embed scripts in their web
pages. Typically, the web application developer knows pre-
cisely which scripts belong in each page (but see Section 3.5).
Therefore, the developer can write a security hook that
checks that every script encountered by the browser is one
of these known scripts; in other words, a whitelist policy.
We implement a whitelist in JavaScript as an associative
array indexed by the SHA-1 hashes of the known scripts.
When afterParseHook is invoked on a script, it hashes the
script and checks whether the hash appears in the array.
For example, if the script <script>alert(0)</script> is
known, then whitelist [SHA1("alert(0)")] should be de-
fined; if an included script of the form <script src="aURL"/>
is known, then whitelist [SHA1("aURL")] should be de-
fined.
Here is a sample implementation:
if (window.JSSecurity) {
JSSecurity.afterParseHook =
function(code, elt, eventName) {
if (whitelist[SHA1(code)]) return true;
else return false;
};





The SHA1 function could be defined as part of the script
in which the above code appears, or it could be part of li-
brary provided by the browser to security hooks. The latter
is clearly preferable: while JavaScript versions of crypto-
graphic functions exist [11], they perform far worse than
native implementations (cf. Section 5.2).
Since the whitelist is indexed by hashes, which must change
every time a script changes, whitelists clearly demand some
automated support in the web development process. We
have built some simple tools to help with this process, and
we describe them in Section 4.2.
3.4 DOM sandboxing
Our second kind of policy, DOM sandboxing, takes a black-
list approach: instead of specifying the approved scripts, we
specify the scripts to be rejected. The web application is
written to produce web pages in which the parts that con-
tain possibly-malicious content are clearly marked, and the
security hook prevents scripts in those parts from executing.
This is useful if some parts of the page should be allowed to
contain unknown scripts, e.g., for third-party ads.
As a first attempt, we suggest that a web application place
possibly-malicious content within <div> or <span> elements
that are marked as “noexecute,” and which act as a sandbox.
<div class="noexecute">. . . possibly-malicious
content. . .</div>
The web application would then supply a security hook that
receives the DOM node of a script as input, and walks the
DOM tree from that node towards the root. If a “noexe-
cute” element is found, the hook function will return false,
preventing execution.
Unfortunately, this implementation of DOM sandboxing
is too simplistic. An attacker can cause a malicious script to
break out of the sandbox by injecting content of the form:
</div><script>malicious script</script><div>
We call this trick node-splitting ; similar tricks are used to
illegally access hidden files in web servers (using .. in URLs)
and to perform SQL injections.
A simple variation solves the problem. The web appli-
cation arranges for all possibly-malicious content to be en-
coded as a JavaScript string, and to be inserted as HTML




"quoted possibly-malicious content "
</script>
Here the “noexecute” node is created separately from its
contents, so that there is no possibility of the contents split-
ting the node.The assignment of the string to the innerHTML
property of the node causes the browser to parse and ren-
der the string as HTML, producing a DOM tree with the
node as parent, even when the string contains a </div> that
attempts to prematurely close the <div> tag of the “noex-
ecute” node. The rules for quoting special characters in
JavaScript strings are simple, so there is no possibility of
malicious content escaping from the string.
HTML frames cause an additional complication. A frame
in a document introduces a child document. If an attacker
injects a script included in a frame, our hook reaches the
top of the frame without encountering the sandbox node,
and must continue searching in the parent document. The
DOM does not provide easy access from the child to its place
in the parent, so our hook must do some searching in the
parent document to find the frame element. The complete
implementation is available at the BEEP web site [9].
3.5 Discussion
Using BEEP policies, the web site and the browser can co-
operate to provide complete coverage against injected scripts.
This is because (1) the hook function implements complete
mediation, scrutinizing all scripts before execution, and (2)
the unapproved (and possibly injected) scripts are clearly
distinguished from approved scripts by the policy and will
therefore be rejected.
There may be cases in which a web site wishes to approve a
script provided by a third party. For example, web sites may
use ad networks like AdBrite [1] to display advertisements on
their pages. Typically, the ad network will provide a snippet
of JavaScript for the web site to include in its pages. When
the page is displayed in the user’s browser, the JavaScript
will then retrieve content to display the ad, overwriting the
original JavaScript. This can be accommodated by BEEP;
the web site simply needs to approve this “ad-retrieving”
script along with its own—it would either place it in the
whitelist, or outside any sandbox. However, blindly trusting
this third-party script is not without risk: the script may
actually be malicious, e.g., part of a scheme to perform click-
fraud [5]. BEEP does not provide any guidance on whether
to trust a third party.
Scripts can also dynamically create new scripts and insert
them into the page using DOM operations; e.g., some ads are
implemented this way. If a script is trusted, BEEP implicitly
trusts the scripts it installs. Given that trusted scripts are
already quite powerful (e.g., the script can modify any part
of the document, including the security hook) this is not an
additional risk. Indeed, BEEP does not suggest whether a
user should trust a particular site or the scripts it provides.
Rather, BEEP ensures that a browser only runs those scripts
actually endorsed by a given trusted site.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
To deploy our BEEP implementation we must modify
client-side browsers to support security hooks, and we must
modify web applications to embed security hooks as policies.
We successfully modified several browsers and web applica-
tions and, as we describe here, found the changes to be small
and straightforward, presenting little barrier to adoption.
4.1 Browser modifications
Konqueror and Safari. We have modified the Kon-
queror and Safari browsers to support security hook func-
tions. These browsers are related: Safari’s rendering en-
gine (WebKit) was forked from Konqueror’s in 2002. Kon-
queror’s engine currently consists of approximately 200,000
lines of C++, while Safari’s consists of about 350,000 lines of
C++. Our modifications required changing or adding roughly
650 lines of code in both cases, along with a standard SHA-1
implementation of also about 650 lines.
In both browsers, each frame in an HTML document is
handled by a single instance of the HTML parsing and ren-
dering engine which in turn is associated with an instance
of the JavaScript interpreter. As might be expected, the
required changes were limited to the interface between the
HTML and JavaScript engines. This interface is bi-direc-
tional — the HTML engine invokes the JavaScript inter-
preter to execute scripts that it encounters while parsing
the document, and a JavaScript function can modify the
document tree that is managed by the HTML engine.
To implement afterParseHook, we had to take special
care to ensure that certain modifications to the document
tree that occur due to the execution of JavaScript do not
result in invocations of the hook function. For instance, if a
JavaScript function (already authorized by afterParseHook)
chooses to insert a dynamically-generated script into the
document we must ensure that the hook function is not
called once again. The majority of changes (in terms of
lines of code) in both browsers were due to a small refactor-
ing that was necessary to handle this case.
Opera. We have also implemented partial support for
our hooks in a closed-source browser, Opera. Opera sup-
ports a feature called User JavaScripts intended to allow
users to customize the web pages of arbitrary sites. For
example, if a web site relies on non-standard behavior of In-
ternet Explorer, an Opera user can write a User JavaScript
that is invoked whenever a page from the site is rendered,
and which rewrites the page content so that it renders cor-
rectly in Opera. The User JavaScript programming interface
permits registering JavaScript callback functions to handle
events that occur during parsing and rendering. Crucially,
User JavaScript is executed before any scripts on the web
page, and it can prevent any script on the web page from
executing.
We have written a User JavaScript for Opera that does
two things. First, it defines a JSSecurity object for ev-
ery web page, within which a web page can register its
afterParseHook function. Second, it registers a handler
function that calls the user’s JSSecurity.afterParseHook
(if it exists) on script execution events. The Opera im-
plementation handles <script> elements perfectly. Opera
does not invoke callbacks when parsing a script within an
event handler, but we can insert a callback just before an
event is delivered to a listener. Similarly, we can insert a
callback just before a javascript:URL is executed; however,
in this case, Opera does not make the DOM node of the
URL available, so we cannot implement DOM sandboxing
for javascript:URLs in Opera. The complete User Java-
Script is 79 commented lines of code (available at the BEEP
web site [9]) along with 137 lines for the SHA-1 implemen-
tation in JavaScript.
Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer. We have
a partial implementation of security hooks in the Firefox
browser and hope to have a full implementation shortly. We
have not yet investigated Internet Explorer. It is worth men-
tioning that both browsers have extensions that can func-
tion something like the User JavaScript provided by Opera;
the Firefox extension is called Greasemonkey and the IE ex-
tension is called Trixie. However, these extensions are not
sufficient to implement BEEP, because scripts embedded in
a page can execute before the extensions are triggered.
4.2 Web application modifications
Adding BEEP security policies to web application pages
is fairly straightforward. For the whitelist policy, this can
be done with some simple tool support, depending on how
the application was written. For the DOM-based policy, the
application developer must author the pages according to
the required structure.
Whitelist policies. For applications written directly in a
mixture of HTML and JavaScript, it is straightforward for
a tool to identify the scripts on each page, calculate their
hashes, and insert the whitelist and security hook into the
document’s head. A web developer could use such a tool to
add policies to his pages prior to deployment—i.e., when the
pages do not contain any user content all scripts are legal.
We have written such a tool based on the Tidy HTML
parser [30]. Currently, the tool searches for scripts where
they most frequently occur: in <script> elements, in event
handlers, and in the URLs of hyperlinks. Though parsing
page content is a difficult problem in general, in this case
the parsed content is non-malicious, and thus presumably
non-obfuscated. Moreover, if a script is missed there is no
risk to security as it is not added to the whitelist. Support
for applications that use uncommon combinations of HTML
and JavaScript might be better provided by adapting a so-
phisticated server-side filter to identify and hash all scripts
in the static content of a page.
Web applications can also be developed from higher-level
languages and/or specifications, in lieu of authoring HTML
and JavaScript directly. For example, Links [15] compiles
programs written in a special purpose language and the
Google Web Toolkit (GWT) [6] compiles Java programs into
web applications that, on the client-side, are implemented
in JavaScript and HTML. For these applications, we would
like the toolkit compilers to introduce the security hook au-
tomatically. To show that this is feasible, we modified Links
to generate and insert the whitelist for the emitted scripts;
the changes to the compiler were fairly small—only 60 LOC.
GWT is distributed only in binary form, so we were unable
to attempt a similar modification.
Finally, for applications that generate HTML dynamically
(e.g., by using server-side PHP, JSP, etc.), the generated
HTML must include the policy. Fortunately, emitted scripts
often appear directly in the page-generating code, so it is
straightforward to copy them into a document on which to
run our script identification tool. One could imagine au-
thoring language-specific tools to do this automatically.
DOM sandboxing. In contrast to whitelist policies,
DOM sandboxing is simple enough to apply by hand. We
modified Blixlwiks, a custom blog and wiki engine that we
use to run cyclone.thelanguage.org, to implement DOM
sandboxing. This involved writing one function to escape
JavaScript strings, another to output sandboxed content,
and a third to output the hook function in each page. In
total we added about 40 lines of code, plus the 34-line hook
function (which can be obtained from the BEEP site [9]).
It should be just as easy to modify a web application writ-
ten in a templating language such as PHP. Templating lan-
guages make it easy to insert content into boilerplate HTML,
and also provide functions for quoting content as strings.
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We conducted experiments to verify the effectiveness of
our BEEP implementation and to measure its overhead. We
found that, as expected, our implementation defeated a wide
array of known attacks, while using it on typical web sites
imposed a low to moderate overhead when custom support
for BEEP was available in the web browser.
5.1 Defending against attacks
BEEP as described in Section 3 should provide complete
protection against injected scripts, assuming we have inter-
cepted all invocations of the JavaScript interpreter in the
browser source code. To verify this, we constructed a test
suite of attack vectors, each of which is a snippet of HTML
and JavaScript that forms the foundation of a script injec-
tion attack. A successful attack against a blog/wiki applica-
tion would result in embedding this vector in user-provided
content. Using S3AjaxWiki and Blixlwiks enhanced to in-
clude whitelist and sandboxing policies, respectively, we de-
feated all the attacks.
Our test suite is based on 61 XSS attack vectors published
by ha.ckers.org [23]. The vectors incorporate obfuscation
to evade common server-side filters, and they have been
tested to ensure execution on at least one major browser.
Of the 61 vectors, we found that 17 were accepted by Kon-
queror, 9 were accepted by Safari, and 33 were accepted by
Opera as legal scripts (the remaining vectors are accepted
by some other browser).
The top part of Figure 3 contains a representative sam-
ple of the 61 vectors. The first vector will confuse a filter
that looks for <script src=...> without expecting addi-
tional attributes. The second vector is more complicated
and relies on the way in which a browser interprets the text
written into the document by JavaScript functions. A vul-
nerable browser would interpret the result of executing the
first part of the vector (enclosed within well-formed script
tags) concatenated with the remaining part as a legal script
element that includes the malicious script file “xss.js”. The
third vector might evade a server filter that does not expect
scripts to appear as attributes within a tag intended to in-
clude images in a document. The fourth vector is a version
of the primary vector used by the Samy worm. The final
vector exploits a feature of some browsers that allows an
XML document containing JavaScript to be inlined in an
HTML document.
To model a script injection attack on a web site, we in-
jected each of the attack vectors, one per document, into sev-
eral of the pages that comprise the target application. For
the whitelist policies, we used S3AjaxWiki, and for DOM
sandboxing we used Blixlwiks. Each S3AjaxWiki page is
derived from a common template for all wiki pages that
includes a whitelist security hook function (generated by
our tool) in the head of the document. A fragment of an
S3AjaxWiki page, as used in our test suite, is shown in the
bottom part of Figure 3; the script that appears in the body
of the page is the injected attack vector. Our modifications
to Blixlwiks were described above.
5.2 Overhead
To understand the performance overhead of our BEEP im-
plementation, we measured the difference in rendering time
of the ten most popular web sites (according to alexa.com)
with and without our policies installed. Measured overheads
were low to moderate.
Whitelist policies. To measure rendering time overhead,
we automated the following process. First, we retrieved the
front page of each of the top ten web sites, along with all el-
ements on which it depends for proper rendering, and stored
them locally (to remove the variability of the network from
our measurements). Next, we used our script identification
tool (cf. Section 4.2) to compute a SHA-1 hash of each script
that appeared within a page. We then inserted a script
defining an afterParseHook function as the first element in
the <head> of each document.
We then benchmarked our modified version of Safari by
viewing the BEEP-enabled pages in the browser, running on
a 1.67 GHz G4 PowerBook laptop and MacOS X 10.4. Each
of the ten web pages was loaded in the browser twenty times,
and we measured the total time taken by the browser to load
the entire document, using Safari’s loading-time measure-
ment feature [26]. The total time to load the 200 unmodified
pages was 177.4 seconds, as compared to 192.3 seconds to
load the pages that included whitelist policies, for an aver-
age overhead of 8.3%. The greatest overhead was 15% for
1 <SCRIPT a=">" SRC="xss.js"></SCRIPT>
2 <SCRIPT>document.write("<SCRI");</SCRIPT>PT SRC="xss.js"></SCRIPT>
3 <IMG SRC="javascript:alert(’XSS’);">
4 <DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert(’XSS’))">










<p>This is the default page content. You should edit this.</p>
<SCRIPT SRC=xss.js></SCRIPT><!-- This is the injected attack vector -->
</div>
</body></html>
Figure 3: A representative sample of attack vectors in our test-suite and a template page for the test cases.
the cnn.com front page, which inlines several large scripts
for which hashes must be computed by the hook function.
In contrast, for a site like ebay.com there was virtually no
increase in loading time for the BEEP policies. Note that
this overhead would likely be lower if we included network
latency in our measurements.
Native support for SHA-1 was crucial for obtaining good
performance. For example, using a purely JavaScript imple-
mentation of SHA-1 resulted in an overhead of nearly 48%
when loading cnn.com.
DOM Sandbox policies. We also modified the ten web
pages to include a trivial DOM-sandboxing policy where no
<div> or <span> in the page is marked with a “noexecute”
tag. The purpose here is to measure the cost of traversing
the DOM to validate scripts for the common case in which
no malicious script has been injected in a page. For this
case, we used our User JavaScript extensions to Opera as
the browser platform, running on the same G4 PowerBook
laptop. It took 340.8 seconds to load 200 unmodified web
pages in an Opera environment that did not include any User
JavaScript, and 428.5 seconds to load the modified pages in
the BEEP-enabled configuration of Opera. This represents
an average overhead in loading time of 25.7%, or about .43
seconds on the average 1.7 second page load.
We are unable at this time to report the performance
of the DOM-sandboxing policy in Safari and Konqueror.
The implementation of the HTML parser in these browsers
is such that when the afterParseHook function is called,
the DOM tree is not fully constructed for 9 out of the 10
pages, and the traversal of the DOM required by the pol-
icy fails. We are addressing this issue by incorporating an
additional kind of hook function into our modified versions
of Safari and Konqueror. This function, which we call the
beforeExecuteHook, will be called just prior to the execu-
tion of a script, rather than just after the parsing of a script.
At that stage in the loading of a document, the DOM tree
is sufficiently well-formed to permit the necessary traver-
sal. We will update our results to include these additional
measurements and report them on our web site [9].
6. RELATED WORK
We are not aware of any other implementation of BEEP,
but we have seen discussion of a related idea in the Mozilla
forums: Markham has proposed communicating some poli-
cies on scripts from web site to browser in an HTTP header
[16]. In comparison to our work, his selection of policies
is fixed, e.g., “only scripts in the header are allowed to exe-
cute,” and do not seem to include policies that could, for ex-
ample, allow some event handlers in a page to execute, while
preventing others. Our implementation is more flexible and
can accommodate such policies, which appear needed to
handle common practice in web applications. Using HTTP
headers also seems to require more intrusive changes to web
applications and browsers than our work. Relative to that
proposal, Schmidt suggested the idea of using a DIV element
as a DOM sandbox, but did not address node-splitting [28].
Mozilla has a feature called signed scripts [24]. Digital sig-
natures could be used as a basis for BEEP, providing a way
to distinguish between approved and non-approved scripts,
but Mozilla’s signed scripts cannot be used this way. In-
stead, scripts are signed when they require additional priv-
ileges, such as writing to local files, and the absence of a
signature does not constrain scripts.
Server-side techniques to protect against script injection
attacks have been reported extensively in the literature. A
systematic approach to filtering injected attacks involves
partitioning trusted and untrusted content into separate chan-
nels and subjecting all untrusted content to application de-
fined sanitization checks [20]. Su and Wassermann [29] de-
velop a formal model for command injection attacks and
apply a syntactic criterion to filter out malicious dynamic
content. Applications of taint checking to server programs
that generate content to ensure that untrustworthy input
does not flow to vulnerable application components have
also been explored [18, 10, 32].
While insights borrowed from server-side filtering can, in
principle, be brought to bear in the design of security hook
functions, our work is most closely related to other client-
side techniques to protect users from malicious web content.
Noxes [12] is a purely client-side method that aims to de-
fend against cross-site scripting by disallowing the browser
from contacting “bad” URLs. It has general rules for black-
listing and whitelisting web sites in which links that are
statically present in the page are placed in the whitelist,
while dynamically-generated links are disallowed. Because
Noxes policies blacklist script-generated links, they can be
restrictive for applications with substantial client-side logic,
e.g., in Ajax-enabled applications. Moreover, link blacklist-
ing is not enough to prevent all attacks, e.g., those not in
violation of the same origin principle, as was the case of the
Samy worm. By contrast, our policies either permit or deny
execution of entire scripts, as determined by the host site.
BrowserShield [22] proposes a two-step architecture to
protect against browser vulnerabilities such as buffer over-
runs. Prior to being loaded in a browser, a document is
rewritten (say, at a firewall or web proxy) so that certain
trusted JavaScript functions mediate the access of the doc-
ument tree by the untrusted scripts in the document. The
policy (as embodied by the rewriting step) is then enforced
in the browser by the trusted JavaScript functions. Browser-
Shield policies are far richer than ours, as they can mediate
individual script actions, whereas we consider only whether
to run the script at all. As a result, BrowserShield has a cor-
respondingly higher implementation (and trust) burden, es-
pecially since parsing HTML and JavaScript are non-trivial
when accommodating many possible browsers, as we have
argued. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the main
usage mode for BrowserShield, the policy is expected to be
specified independently of the site that serves the content.
In this mode, it is unclear how a policy might distinguish
between malicious republished content that, say, accesses a
document’s cookie from a server-trusted script that does the
same. Combining BEEP with BrowserShield might result in
the best of both worlds: BEEP would accurately filter illegal
scripts, and BrowserShield would allow client-based policing
of server-provided scripts.
Hallaraker and Vigna [7] modified Mozilla to monitor the
JavaScript operations of a web page and invoke countermea-
sures against malicious behavior. This permits fine-grained
policies on JavaScript execution in the browser. However,
the work does not address communicating policies from the
web site to the browser.
Jackson et al. [8] describe several unexpected repositories
of private information in the browser’s cache that could be
stolen by XSS attacks. They advocate applying a refinement
of the same-origin policy [25] to cover aspects of browser
state that extend beyond cookies. By allowing the server
to explicitly specify the scripts that it intentionally includes
in the document, our approach can also be thought of as
an extension of the same-origin policy. In particular, our
policies ensure that all scripts that executed in the page
are trusted by the site from which the page originated; we
believe this is actually the assumption of most users.
There are some analogies between our BEEP policies and
intrusion detection systems (IDS). The filtering problem arises
in network intrusion detection (IDS) systems [21]. In partic-
ular, just as different browsers accept and render HTML dif-
ferently, different operating systems may accept and process
packets slightly differently, even packets that are ill-formed.
As a result, the IDS might think a packet is harmless be-
cause it is ill-formed, but in fact a particular OS might ac-
cept it and thereby be exploited. Our solution is analogous
to a host-based intrusion detection system (HBIDS) [31, 4].
In these systems, a program’s correct behavior is character-
ized in advance in terms of actions like system calls, and
an execution monitor detects when a program deviates from
its allowable behavior. In BEEP, the allowable behavior
is defined by the web site in terms of whitelisted (or non-
sandboxed) scripts, and attempts to deviate from it are pre-
vented by the browser.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented Browser-Enforced Embedded
Policies (BEEP), a simple technique for defeating script in-
jection attacks on web applications. The broad diversity
of what browsers will accept as valid HTML makes script
detection/filtering difficult at the server. To the contrary,
the browser has perfect knowledge of when it will execute a
script. We exploit this insight to allow servers to embed a
security hook function in their pages that will be executed
in a suitably-modified browser prior to executing a script.
The hook function can thereby remove malicious scripts with
perfect precision when employing a server-provided whitelist
or sandbox. Changes to applications and browsers are small
and localized, and performance overhead is small, making
possible deployment practical. We plan to further explore
the possibilities of BEEP, experimenting with additional
policies and greater policy language support. Code, patches,
and experimental data are available from our web site [9].
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